Collective Risks in Local Administrations: Can a Private Insurer Be Better than a Public Mutual Fund? by Luigi Buzzacchi & Gilberto Turati
 
COLLECTIVE RISKS IN LOCAL ADMINISTRA-
TIONS: CAN A PRIVATE INSURER BE BETTER 

















Working paper No. 3 - March 2009 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND 
PUBLIC FINANCE “G. PRATO” 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
Founded in 1404 









COLLECTIVE RISKS IN LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS: 
CAN A PRIVATE INSURER BE BETTER  









Università di Torino 




In this paper we consider the institutional arrangements needed in a decentralised framework to cope with 
the potential adverse welfare effects caused by localized negative shocks (e.g., natural disasters, terrorist 
attacks, or even clinical errors) that can be limited by precautionary investments. We model the role of a 
public mutual fund to cover these “collective risks”. We start from the under-investment problem stemming 
from the moral hazard of Local administrations when the fund is managed by the Central government, which 
also takes into account the equalisation of resources across administrations. We then study the potential role 
of private insurers in solving the under-investment problem. Our analysis shows that the public fund is 
always superior to the private insurance solution in the presence of hard budget constraints. However, when 
the Central government cannot credibly commit to an optimal transfer rule, private insurers are sometimes 
able to improve on the public mutual fund solution by inducing a higher level of investments.  
 
JEL Codes: H23, H77, G22 
 
Keywords: intergovernmental relations, private insurer, collective risks 
                                                 
†  We wish to thank Michele Grillo, Tommaso Valletti and seminar participants at Catholic University 
(Milano), the 7th European Conference on Health Economics (University of Roma Tor Vergata), the 13th 
AIES Conference (Matera), for insightful comments. Usual disclaimers apply. Research funding from PRIN 
2005 (Project no. 2005137858_003) is gratefully acknowledged. 
♣ Corresponding author: Politecnico di Torino – DISPEA, C.so Duca degli Abruzzi 24, 10129 Torino, Italy.   2
1. Introduction 
 
People suffer and die from fires, floods, or earthquakes that strike the area they live in 
because of unprepared and ineffective responses when the disasters occurred. People suffer 
and die as a consequence of terrorist attacks because security agencies are inaccurate or 
make mistakes in processing relevant information. People face severe limitations in their 
abilities or die because of inadequate organization in the provision of medical care in local 
hospitals. In all of these and several other examples that can be classified as collective risks 
borne by local communities, two questions are put at the forefront of public discussion 
whenever an unfortunate event occurs: what can public administrations do to alleviate the 
adverse welfare effects on people hit by negative shocks? What should have been done in 
order to avoid the occurrence of these negative shocks? As for the first question, a transfer 
policy aimed at providing initial help by the government is usually called for. This expresses 
a common claim for solidarity toward those who suffered welfare losses. As for the second 
question, much of the damage (or some of its consequences at least) can be avoided by 
investing in mitigation. In the case of floods, for instance, dams and barriers can be built to 
reduce the likelihood of losses occurring, or the severity of damage; in the case of terrorist 
attacks, better organized intelligence services can be of great help. 
The economic literature has almost neglected two features common to all these situations: 
first, the ex-post transfer is implemented by the Central government, which assigns 
financial resources to local administrations (municipalities, regions, or hospitals). In this 
case, as shown by the vast amount of literature on fiscal federalism, a potential problem of 
opportunistic behaviour by local levels of government can emerge (on this specific point, 
Wildasin, 2008). Second, local administrations often buy coverage on private insurance 
markets, transferring risks to private companies (e.g. CEA, 2007). 
The consequences of these intergovernmental relations has received little attention in the 
literature. The possibility that the ex-post transfer can influence the ex-ante precautionary 
investment has been investigated only by Goodspeed and Haughwout (2007), and Wildasin 
(2008). For this reason, the fact that a public administration should insure itself is a very 
intriguing question, that has never been addressed before as far as we know. As has been 
suggested by the literature on public bankruptcies (see e.g. McConnell and Picker, 1993), 
the imposition of new taxes, at least in principle, is in fact a remedy for coping with welfare   3
losses that no private insurer can duplicate, and thus makes private insurance a Pareto-
inferior solution in a centralised framework. To put it differently, as Arrow and Lind (1970) 
have shown, the expected utility losses are approximately zero as the number of taxpayers 
becomes larger and larger. In other words, in a centralised framework, the costs of risk-
bearing can be optimally spread throughout the community by central government. 
In this paper, we build on the work by Goodspeed and Haughwout (2007) and analyse the 
potential role of private insurers in solving the under-investment problem in protection 
stemming from the moral hazard of local administrations in a decentralised framework. In 
particular, we compare the welfare properties of a public mutual fund with those of a 
compulsory private insurance for local administrations, both in the case of a hard or a soft 
budget constraint. These two institutional arrangements require local administrations to pay 
a contribution – implicit in the case of the mutual fund, explicit in the case of a premium to 
be paid to an insurer – in order to obtain coverage for local collective risks. Our analysis 
shows that a public fund is always superior to the private insurance solution in the presence 
of hard budget constraints for local administrations. However, when the central 
government cannot credibly commit to an optimal transfer rule, private insurers are 
sometimes able to improve on the mutual public fund solution by inducing a higher level 
of precautionary investments. The main intuition for these results is that while the public 
mutual fund operates with ex-post contributions defined on the actual realisation of losses, 
private insurers need to define an ex-ante premium. This latter mechanism is less efficient in 
terms of providing the right incentives to invest in protection because – contributions 
being equal – the public fund mechanism provides more equality among local 
administrations. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the baseline model, 
and the outcome in the presence of a mutual fund, both under a hard and a soft budget 
constraint regime. The role of private insurers is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses 
the results and Section 5 briefly concludes the paper. 
 
2. The baseline model 
 
Our analysis is based on a very simple and stylised model in the vein of Goodspeed and 
Haughwout (2007). We consider a game where a Federal (“Central”) government interacts   4
with N lower level (“Local”) administrations. One can think of these actors as Regional (or 
State) governments, or some other local autonomous public bodies such as schools, 
hospitals, or universities. The main differences between the two layers of governments are 
related to the assignment of taxing power and to the management of public assets. Only 
the Central government retains the power to tax citizens, whereas this right is not awarded 
to Local administrations. The latter are entitled to manage some public assets that face a 
specific type of risk. Local administrations, for example, can reduce potential losses by 
investing in protection, but these investments are not observable by the Central 
government. 
The Central government C defines ex-ante a global budget NΩ of total transfers to Local 
(identical) administrations to be used for three main purposes: (a) current expenditures; (b) 
precautionary investments; (c) repayment of losses. As discussed in the introduction, many 
different examples fit into this general framework. Think for instance about the severe 
problem of damage to the environment caused by fires or floods, where precautionary 
investments are programmed at the regional level. Before moving further, notice that in our 
model the global budget is fixed to NΩ , even though the distribution of funds to the Local 
administrations might be discretionary in certain circumstances. We will analyse different 
scenarios, depending on whether the Central government is able to commit ex-ante to a 
specific transfer rule or not. In the first decentralised situation we consider, the 
commitment to the transfer rule is credible (i.e. soft budget constraint problems are ruled 
out). This assumption is relaxed later in the paper. 
There is only one period: precautionary investments exhaust their preventive impact during 
the period that also coincides with the electoral cycle, at both the local and central level. 
The timing of the game is defined as follows: 
 
a)  first, Central government announces a ‘transfer rule’ T, i.e. the amount of funds 
that will be transferred to each Local administration (T1, T2, …, TN); 
b)  then, Local administrations (acting simultaneously) define the amount of resources 
to be invested in protection I. Investments are not verifiable by the Central 
government (i.e. transfers cannot be contingent to investments); 
c)  Nature determines the realisation of loss di in each single administration i, which are   5
assumed to be independent (i.e. Cov[di, dj] = 0) and observable by all players.
1 To 
simplify the presentation of our argument, we also assume that d takes up only two 
possible outcomes D (> 0) and 0 with probability respectively δ(I)p and (1 – δ(I)p). 
Investments I clearly influence the loss probabilities
2; we assume that ∂δ/∂I < 0, 
∂
2δ/∂I
2 > 0, and we normalize δ(0) = 1; 
d)  finally, the Central government implements the transfers automatically, according 
to the pre-determined transfer rule T, and each Local administration i is able to 
define the (ex-post) budget for current expenditure xi = Ti – Ii – di. 
 
Central government’s payoff is represented by a generalised utilitarian social welfare 
function, defined explicitly on a standard efficiency-equality trade-off in order to account 
for both the total (expected) amount of current expenditures xi and the (expected) 
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(1) 
where  x  is the mean expenditure of Local administrations. Notice that α (> 0) accounts 
for the degree of inequality aversion of the Central government: the higher α, the higher 
the loss in utility stemming from inequality. Moreover, as the first term in Eq. (1) is the 
sum of current expenditures, Central government payoff shows a sort of “aversion” to 
losses, since it clearly reduces the expected current expenditures.
3 
Local administrations’ payoffs are defined only on expected current expenditures: 
[ ] N ,..., i ; x E i i 1 = = Π   (2) 
The intuition behind this formulation is quite simple: local politicians are rewarded for local 
                                                 
1 Notice that the independence assumption easily stems from the localised nature of these risks. Fires, floods, 
terrorist attacks, clinical mistakes are all investing in a specific local community, not a whole country. 
2 The literature (see for example Jullien et al., 1999) distinguishes between protection investments (when the 
investment is aimed at reducing the probability of the adverse event) and prevention investments (when the 
investment is aimed at reducing the severity of the damage). In our setup, I is consequently a ‘protection’ 
investment. 
3 Notice that when α is null, ΠC is simply a Benthamite (utilitarian) social welfare function. For α > 0, ΠC 
becomes a generalised (utilitarian) SWF, represented as a linear function of mean and variance of the current 
expenditures of the Local administrations. This is not new in the literature: see, e.g., Picard (2008) in the 
context of natural disasters, and Konrad and Seitz (2003) in the context of fiscal federalism.   6
expenditures, but not for investments in protection, which are not observable by 
assumption. Hence, the higher xi,, the higher the probability they will be re-elected. Notice 
that we have modelled Local administrations as risk-neutral players. 
 
The transfer rule T defined ex-ante by the Central government takes into account the 
commitment to a global budget fixed to NΩ. However, Ti can be made contingent to the 
distribution of losses. If M is the number of Local administrations hit by losses D (0 ≤ M ≤ 
N), the transfer rule able to perform full mutualisation of losses is the following: 
() () M d d d T i i i − + = Ω   (3a) 
where  () M d  = D M/N represents the average actual loss. In other words, the transfer rule 
expressed by Eq. (3a) can be interpreted as the sum of three components: (a) a symmetric 
flat transfer Ω; (b) a transfer from a ‘mutuality fund’ that repays each loss di (di = D or 0); 
(c) a contribution to the ‘mutuality fund’, equal to the average realised loss  () M d . 
The Central government might prefer only a partial mutualisation of losses. The general 
form of the transfer rule is then: 
() () [] M d d d T i i i − + = ϑ Ω   (3b) 
The second term, again, represents the working of the public mutual fund, composed of 
the reimbursement of losses ϑdi, and the mutuality contribution  () M d ϑ  needed to finance 
(partial) reimbursements of losses. Clearly, ϑ ∈ [0,1] is the degree of mutuality, or namely 
the coverage. 
 
The expected payoff for the Central government can then be expressed as: 
()()
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(4) 
where  p D d ˆ = 0  is the expected loss in the absence of any investments, and:   7
() () ( ) ()
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Each term of the sum represents the variance of current expenditures among local 
administrations in the specific state of nature when M shocks occurred, weighted for the 
probability of such state of nature π (M). Notice that the first term in Eq. (4) (i.e. E[Σ xi]) 
does not directly depend on ϑ since ϑ only affects the level of compensating transfers 
(added to some Local administrations and subtracted from others).
4 The term Ψ does not 
depend on ϑ either, and decreases as N increases.
5  
 
Finally, the payoff of Local administration i is the following:
6 
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2.1. The benchmark case: full centralisation 
We begin our analysis by defining a benchmark case, without any strategic interaction 
between different layers of government, and considering all decisions to be centralised. In 
this case, Central government defines both the transfer T and investments I in each Local 
administration. Remember that since Local administrations are identical, it follows that Ii=I 
                                                 
4 As will soon become clear, the transfer rule indeed affects the investment strategies of the Local 
administrations, thus defining the ultimate amount of the budget that is free for current expenditures. 
5 As is evident in Eq. [4a], given N, Ψ is increased in particular by the terms where (N – M) and M assume 
similar values. When damage is uncommon, the probability of such states of nature decreases when the 
number of administrations (N) is greater. 
6 Notice that the payoffs expressed in Eq. (4) and (5) are obtained assuming that losses can take only two 
possible outcomes, an hypothesis we maintain throughout the paper. Clearly enough, this assumption of a 
binomial distribution of losses is made only to simplify presentation. All of our results can be easily 
interpreted in the more general framework also, where losses are distributed according to a generic 
probability density function including those describing extreme events as discussed in Wildasin (2008). In this 
framework, the average actual loss  () M d  and the average expected loss in the absence of precautionary 
investments  0 d ˆ  are still defined accordingly. The definition of Ψ becomes more complex, but it retains the 
property of independence from ϑ, and of a negative correlation with N.   8
∀i. The Central government problem can then be simplified to: 
() [] () ( ) () { } I , N d ˆ I I N max max , I C , I δ Ψ ϑ α δ Ω Π ϑ ϑ
2
0 1− − − − =   (6) 
Central government first determines ϑ (given I), then selects the amount of resources to be 
invested in protection I. The F.O.C. for the solution of the problem is: 
() ( ) () 0 1 2 = − =
∂
∂





which bring us to the optimal ‘degree of mutuality’ ϑ
*c = 1  (where superscript c is a 
mnemonic for ‘centralised’). Notice that ϑ
*c is determined by looking solely at the ‘equality 
component’ of the Central government’s payoff function. Given the fixed budget NΩ, the 
result is not surprising: Local administrations will be sharing losses, whenever they occur. 
ϑ
*c makes null the second term of Eq. (1) (the equality component): consequently, given 
ϑ
*c, the Central government defines the optimal investment in protection I  to be 
implemented, by maximising the ‘efficiency component’ of its payoff: 
() [ ] 0 d ˆ I I maxI δ Ω − −   (8) 
The F.O.C. implies: 
()









which implicitly characterizes the optimal investment I
*c. Interpretation of Eq. (9) is 
straightforward: marginal benefits of investing in protection (given by the marginal 
reduction in the value of expected losses) equals marginal costs. 
 
2.2. The decentralised case: the public mutual fund with credible commitment 
In the benchmark case all decisions are centralised. However, in most real-world cases, 
precautionary investment are in the hands of Local administrations; and these can decide 
their amounts, which Central government cannot observe. We solve the game by backward 
induction, and look for sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. We then begin with the 
decision of Local administrations to invest, and then we analyse the definition of the 
transfer rule T (i.e. the level of ϑ) by the Central government. 
When each Local administration decides the optimal investments to be implemented, given 
ϑ, it will maximise its own expected payoff, considering only the total current expenditures   9
x in its administration. The problem to be solved by Local administration i (see Eq. (5)) 
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which implicitly defines the optimal investment Ii
*, which clearly depends onϑ.  
Given that the Local administrations are identical, we will of course have Ii
* = I
*d ∀i (where 
now superscript d is mnemonic for ‘decentralised’). Notice that – by simply comparing Eq. 
(9) with Eq. (11) – it is clear that protection investments are reduced with respect to the 
benchmark case, for every ϑ > 0; moreover, I
*d decreases when N increases. This is a 
strategic effect stemming from ϑ itself: each Local administration prefers to free-ride on 
investments and spend in x;  the free-riding effect being clearly emphasised when the 
number of Local administrations is greater. Indeed, own investments increase the 
probability that Local administration will subsidise the other ones for (potential) losses, and 
this clearly reduces the incentive to invest. There is then a vertical externality, quite common 
in the literature on fiscal federalism, which influences the optimal amount of ϑ that will be 
chosen by the Central government. Notice also that I
*d will be strictly positive even when ϑ 
= 1.
7 As we will show in the next Section, the presence of free-riding marks a striking 
difference between public transfer rules and private insurance mechanisms: when insurers 
are involved, the premium paid by a specific Local administration is not affected by the 
realisation of losses, while in the public case, each realised loss increases the mutuality 
contribution,  d ϑ , of each single administration (see Eq.(3b)). 
Given the choice of the investments to be implemented by the Local administrations, 
Central government will then define the optimal transfer rule T, which amounts to defining 
the mutualisation degreeϑ, since the total budget NΩ is fixed. The optimal additional 
                                                 
7 The optimal investment I
* monotonically decreases when ϑ and N increase, until it becomes zero. If the 
absolute value of δ ′(0) is sufficiently high, I
* is positive in the whole range [0,1] of ϑ.   10
transfer  ϑ
*d will stem from two countervailing effects: on the one hand, Central 
government has the incentive to fix ϑ
*d as close as possible to ϑ
*c = 1 in order to guarantee 
equality among local constituencies; on the other hand, by guaranteeing full mutualisation 
of losses, it reduces the incentive of a Local administration to invest in I, since ∂I
*d/∂ϑ < 0. 
The problem to be solved can be written as: 
() [] ()
() ( ) ()
() ϑ
α δ Ω Π
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(13) 
Eq. (13) shows the efficiency-equality trade-off implicit in the payoff function of the 
Central government.  















1  – is 
always negative for every ϑ > 0. Intuitively, the lower the additional transfer, the closer the 
investment will be to its efficient level, which in turn implies a better trade-off between 
investments and expected loss, hence higher current expenditures x. More formally, 
considering the F.O.C. in Eq. (11) and ∂I











































given ϑ > 0.  
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2 is always non-negative, and reaches a minimum at 
ϑ=1, when all losses are fully shared and expenditures equalised in every Local   11
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2  strictly decreases withϑ, while 
for ϑ > 1 the inequality component of the payoff of the Central government increases. As 
a consequence, the RHS of Eq. (11) assumes negative values in the 0 ≤ ϑ < 1 range. 
Moreover, note that if α = 0 (i.e. the Central government cares only about efficiency), the 
F.O.C. reduces to Eq. (9) and investment will consequently be fixed like in the benchmark 
case. The higher α, the closer the additional transfer ϑ





α ϑ d *
.  
We are now able to show the following Proposition 1: 
 
Proposition 1: The degree of mutuality in the case of decentralisation is lower than the one in the 
centralised case, i.e. ϑ
*d < ϑ
*c = 1, and ∂ϑ
*d/∂N < 0. Protection investments I
*d will be reduced with 
respect to the centralised case I
*c, unless Central government cares only about efficiency.  
Proof: Directly from discussion above, since LHS of Eq. (13) is always negative and RHS 
of Eq. (13) is negative only for ϑ
*d < 1, it must be that the optimal degree of mutuality ϑ
*d 
is lower than the one in the centralised case ϑ
*c = 1. As far as ∂I
*d/∂N < 0, the optimal 
trade-off between efficiency and equality asks for stronger investment incentives, i.e. a 
lower ϑ, when the number of Local administrations increases. ■ 
 
Proposition 1 suggests that decentralisation almost always leads to an inefficient outcome: 
given the presence of a vertical externality stemming from the additional transfers in case 
of losses, precautionary investments will be reduced with respect to the centralised case. By 
fixing ϑ, the Central government trades off equality and efficiency: on the one hand, a 
lower ϑ is used to induce more incentives to invest in protection; on the other hand, ϑ 
must be higher in order to guarantee a sufficient degree of mutualisation of losses. Since we 
have ruled out commitment problems thus far, notice that the inefficiency stems only from 
the free-riding behaviour of Local administrations:
8 risk is mutualised amongst all the Local 
                                                 
8 Interestingly, this idea of free-riding behaviour among local governments has received the attention of 
legislators. One example is the arrangement provided by Law 353/2000 in the case of forest fires in Italy. In 
the experimental period between 2000 and 2002, the Central government defined a budget of 10 million euro   12
administrations and the effort to lower the probability of negative events decreases the 
mutuality contribution  d ϑ  for all the participants. This inefficiency will be magnified when 
the Central government is not able to credibly commit to a pre-determined level of 
financing, a point that will be discussed below. 
 
2.3. The decentralised case: the public mutual fund when commitment is not 
credible 
We have assumed so far that Central government is able to commit to a predetermined 
transfer rule and a predetermined budget. While this may be true in some situations, 
especially when the Central government cares only about efficiency, it is definitely difficult 
to sustain when large welfare losses occur. In the case of floods, earthquakes or other 
natural disasters, and more generally when there are huge losses, Central government might 
be not be able to renege on its ex-ante commitment. In other words, in all these cases, after 
the disaster occurred, Central government can step in and redefine the transfers ex-post.
9 
Clearly enough, if Local administrations anticipate this move by the Central government, 
the announcement of the transfer rule at the first stage of the game is not credible. To be 
more precise, the actual transfer rule will be fixed after the state of nature (the level of 
damage in every Local administration) has been observed, and it will maximise ex-post the 
Central government’s payoff.  
The equilibrium strategies are easily obtained from the results of the previous section. 
Simply note that, since the first move of the Central government is “cheap talk”, the 
sequence of moves are reversed here: at the final stage of the game, given protection 
investments are sunk once losses are realised, the transfer rule has no incentive role, and 
Central government maximises the equality component of its payoff by fixing ϑ
*dnc=1 
(whereas now superscript dnc is mnemonic for ‘decentralised and no commitment’), 
regardless of what was announced before; moving backwards , each Local administration 
                                                                                                                                               
per year (NΩ in our notation) to be distributed to regional governments. In turn, regions redistribute financial 
resources to various municipalities according to the following rule: half proportional to the size of the local 
forestry area; half inversely related to the ratio between the size of forestry land destroyed by fire and the 
original size of forested land. As noted by Pazienza and Beraldo (2004), the law “has tried to introduce a 
management of the financial resources used in the fight of forest fires in such a way as to discourage any 
form of free-rider behaviour that could be taken up by regional or other local authorities”. 
9 Notice that this is a simple application of the well-known Samaritan’s dilemma, a typical situation of time 
inconsistency of public policies. See the seminal paper by Buchanan (1975).   13
decides the optimal investments to be implemented, anticipating the optimal response of 
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which can also be obtained directly from Eq. (11) by setting ϑ = 1. Given our assumption 
of identical local administrations, the optimal investment implicit in Eq. [16] is symmetric, 
i.e. Ii
* = I
*dnc. Notice also that by simply comparing Eq. (16) with Eq. (11), protection 
investments are reduced by the inability of the Central government to commit to a 
predetermined transfer rule, since ϑ
*d < 1 (see Proposition 1).  
We are now able to show the following Corollary to Proposition 1: 
 
Corollary to Proposition 1: In the case of decentralisation, when Central government is unable to 
commit to a pre-determined transfer rule, protection investments I
*dnc will be reduced with respect to the case 
with perfect commitment I
*d, unless Central government cares only about efficiency. 
Proof: Directly from discussion above.■ 
 
Notice that I
*dnc will be strictly positive
10 because a loss d in each Local administration, ceteris 
paribus, increases the mutuality contribution,  d ϑ , by the amount ϑd/N. However, for even 
a very small degree of inequality aversion by the Central government, the inability to 
commit to a pre-determined transfer rule will result in a lower level of investments in 
protection by Local administrations. Could the present situation be improved by allowing 
for a private insurance solution? This is what we will present in the next section of the 
paper. 
                                                 
10 See footnote 7 again.   14
 
3. The role of private insurers 
 
In the previous section of the paper we assumed that Local administrations can recover 
from losses only by resorting to additional transfers by the Central government. In many 
real world cases, however, Local administrations (as broadly defined before) buy insurance 
coverage from private providers. For instance, an extensive market for medical malpractice 
insurance has been developing in the U.S. (e.g. Sloan, Chepke, 2008), and in Italy, hospitals 
are forced by law to buy insurance contracts on the market to cover damage arising from 
clinical errors (e.g., Buzzacchi, Gracis, 2008). The Spanish Crop Insurance System involves 
co-operation between Spanish authorities and Agroseguro, an association of private 
insurance companies, to manage the risks and crises in the agriculture and livestock sectors 
(CEA, 2007). A similar arrangement is the French Cat. Nat. System, explicitly designed to 
cover the risks related to natural hazards (see De Marcellis-Warin, Michel-Kerjan, 2001). 
Therefore, one intriguing question is to understand the role of private providers as 
substitutes for the Central government mutual fund. Before moving on to a more formal 
analysis, we can list a number of advantages and disadvantages of private insurers. On the 
one hand, private insurers may be better suited than the Central government to observe a 
proxy for the realised investment in protection. On the other hand, in the case of imperfect 
competition in private insurance markets, for instance, private insurers will gain positive 
profits, hence extracting rent from the public administrations. To avoid easy arguments in 
favour of institutional arrangements where private insurers can play a role, we rule out 
these possibilities here. We assume perfectly competitive insurance markets and we then 
normalise loadings to zero
11. Moreover, we hypothesise that private insurers can only 
observe realisation of losses, as the Central government is able to do. 
In the presence of private insurers, the Central government will transfer the amount Ω to 
each Local administration, possibly leaving the private market the task of covering the risk 
of damage. The fair premium P charged by the insurer to the Local administration depends 
on the level of coverageλ,  where  λ is the share of total losses to be reimbursed. In 
                                                 
11 It is worth noting that we have already assumed the cost of managing the mutual fund by the Central 
government to be zero as well.   15
particular, the premium is fixed equal to the expected loss,  () ()0 d ˆ I P λδ λ =  and, in return, 
the Local administration receives the amount λd from the insurer. 
A crucial point to be emphasised here is what distinguishes the private solution from the 
public one. The insurer gets from the Local administration a premium which is defined ex-
ante (i.e. before the realisation of losses is known), and commits to repay ex-post a share λ of 
the actual loss. Conversely, the transfer rule T is wholly contingent on the distribution of 
realised losses. In other words, even the mutuality contribution  () M d ϑ  (see Eq (3b)) - 
which is a sort of ‘premium’ paid to the Central government - is determined on the basis of 
the damage actually realised. 
Summing up, the funding mechanism of the Central government to the Local 
administration is very similar to the net flow of capital between the Local administration 
and the insurer: given a level of coverage ϑ = λ, the term ϑd equals the amount paid out by 
the insurer, λd, while the mutuality contribution  d ϑ  simply equals actual average loss 
instead of expected average loss, corresponding to the (fair) premium P.  
The premium charged by the insurer needs to deal with the moral hazard problem due to 
the unobservability of investments (Shavell, 1979). In particular, the insurer anticipates the 
disciplining effect of co-insurance on the investment strategy of the insured, i.e. 
() () ( ) 0 d ˆ I P Ins * λ λδ λ =  (where Ins is now a mnemonic for the ‘private insurance’ case). 
Let’s first assume that the Local administration can freely choose the coverage level 
together with the investment I
*Ins: 
() ( ) () [ ]
() () () 0
0 1
d ˆ I P . t . s
d ˆ I I P max max
Ins *
i i
i i i i , I i , I i i i i
λ δ λ λ
δ λ λ Ω Π λ λ
=
− − − − =
 
(17) 
We drop subscript i, since each identical Local administration deals individually with a 
number of competitive private insurers. 
Noticing that investments are fixed after λ has been chosen and the insurance premium 
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(19) 
Summing up, none of the Local administrations purchases any coverage in the private 
insurance market, and the protection investments are fixed to the efficient level
13. Since the 
Local administration is assumed to be risk-neutral. This result can be easily understood 
since the private insurer simply dilutes the investment incentives, and the optimal coverage 
is then the one that guarantees optimal individual incentives (see Eq. (9)). This solution – 
illustrated by Eq. (19) – maximizes E[Σxi]. Recalling our previous discussion, when a 
Central government simply provides a flat transfer Ω (i.e., ϑ = 0), the outcome is 
suboptimal given that - as we have already shown - minimal equality is obtained. 
 
An alternative strategy for the Central government could be the requirement of a 
compulsory minimal coverage level, λ
m.
  The maximisation problem of the Central 
government is then the following:
14 
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(20) 
which implicitly defines the optimal coverage level λ
*m. The issue is then whether it is 
possible to obtain a larger payoff for the Central government if a minimal mandatory 
coverage λ
*m on the private market substitutes the public mechanism described in the 
previous sections. Remember that the optimal transfer rule depends on the ‘credibility 
regime’, i.e. it is T
*d when the Central government is credible, while it merely requests 
perfect ex-post equality when the commitment is not credible. By simply comparing Eq. (9) 
                                                 
12 Remember that  () ( )() ()0 0 1 d ˆ I d ˆ I P δ δ λ λ = − − . 
13 Notice that ∂Πi/∂λ < 0 when λ > 0.  
14 Again, the strategies of the Local administrations are symmetric, so that we can simplify notation to Ii = I
Ins 
∀i..   17
with Eq. (18), it is clear that if λ
m > 0, precautionary investments are reduced with respect 
to the benchmark case.
15 This is a strategic effect which is different from the free-rider 
problem in the decentralised solution: in the present case, no positive externality is 
generated by precautionary investments in each single Local administration on the cost of 
coverage of the other ones. Here the level of investments is suboptimal because the unit 
price of coverage increases with λ
m in order to discipline the moral hazard. Each Local 
administration thus prefers to retain the risk and devote more resources to current 
expenditures  x. By imposing a minimal coverage,
  the Central government trades off 
efficiency and equality. 
 
3.1. The case with credible commitment 
We first compare the private insurance solution to the public mutual fund when the ex-ante 
commitment by the Central government is credible. Not surprisingly, since the net 
payments between the insurer and the Local administration are equal to the expected value 
of the transfer rule in the decentralized solution (E[Ti]), the expected payoff of the Central 
government does not change, given the level of investments I. The decentralised and the 
private insurance solutions can easily be compared thanks to the following Proposition 2: 
 
Proposition 2: The decentralised mutual solution always dominates the private insurance solution when 
the optimal transfer rule is credible.  
Proof: The (market) incentive schemes expressed by Eq. (18) can always be perfectly 
replicated by the Central government (see Eq.(11)), i.e. for every value λ ~, the degree of 




=  generates equal incentive schemes. In other words, since N/(N 
– 1) > 1, the incentive mechanism provided by the decentralised solution is more powerful 
than the insurer’s, namely, equal investments can be induced by the decentralised solution 
by means of higher coverage (hence higher equality).
16 For every pair 
                                                 
15 Remember from footnote 13 that the Local administration will choose the minimal compulsory coverage. 
Again, this is due to the risk-neutrality assumption of the players. When the risk aversion of Local 
administrations is sufficiently high, there is no need to impose coverage. 
16 The reason is that when the coverage level is fixed, a higher investment I does not reduce the premium P, 
while it reduces the term  () M d ϑ  in Ti, because it is evaluated ex-post. This becomes evident considering that   18
( [] 1 0
1
, ~ ; ~
N
N ~ | ~ , ~ ∈
−
= λ ϑ λ ϑ λ ) it is possible to compare  () ϑ Π ~
C
d  with  () λ Π ~
C
Ins . Since 
() () λ ϑ ~ I ~ I Ins * d * = , the efficiency component of the payoff is the same; consequently, 
() ϑ Π ~
C
d  >  () λ Π ~
C
Ins  if and only if () ()
2 2
1 1 ϑ λ ~ ~ − > − , which is always verified. ■ 
 
The decentralised scenario with a public mutual fund strictly dominates the private insurer 
solution when the number of Local administrations is finite. When the number of Local 
administrations tends to infinity, decentralised mutuality and private insurance become 
isomorphic, i.e. every strategy in both regimes can be perfectly replicated in the other so 
that  ( ) d *
C
d * ϑ Π  =  ( ) Ins *
C
Ins * λ Π .
17 
 
3.2. The case when Central government is unable to commit 
We now compare the private insurance solution to the public mutual fund when the 
Central government cannot credibly commit to a predetermined transfer rule. In this case, 
Central government is expected ex-post to perfectly equalise current expenditures among 
local administrations in every state of nature (i.e., to fix ϑ
*dnc = 1). The incentive constraint 
for Local administrations is then expressed by Eq. (16), leading to a payoff for Central 
government which is given by: 
( ) [ ] 0
dnc * dnc *
C
dnc d ˆ I I N δ Ω Π − − =   (21) 
When the Local administrations are insured, the payoff for the Central government is given 
by: 
() () ( ) [ ] () ( ) ( )() 2
0 1 λ λ δ Ψ α λ δ λ Ω Π − − − − = Ins * Ins * Ins *
C
Ins I , N d ˆ I I N  (22) 
The question is whether an optimal λ
m can be chosen such that Π 
Ins
C > Π 
dnc
C, or: 








1 I , N
I d ˆ I I d ˆ I
λ λ δ Ψ α
λ λ δ δ
−
> + − +  
(23) 
We need to distinguish between two cases based on the value of λ
*m, the optimal minimal 
                                                                                                                                               
complete insurance (i.e., λ = 1) generates null protection investments, while in the decentralised solution, 
even when ϑ = 1 protection investments are positive. 
17 Indeed, when N tends to infinity the cost of mutualisation for each single Local administration cannot be 
significantly reduced by its own protection investments.   19
degree of coverage imposed by the Central government. First remember that  () I d ˆ I 0 + δ  
monotonically decreases with I, until its minimum for I = I














18 LHS of Eq.(23) is negative and the condition is 
never verified (remember that RHS is always positive). The public solution gives better 
incentives to the Local administrations and perfect equality: the private market solution is 
then dominated by the decentralised public solution even when the Central government 
cannot credibly commit to an ex-ante defined transfer rule. In the interval 0 ≤ λ





*dnc). Consequently, LHS of Eq.(23) proves to be positive 
and the condition in Eq. (23) is verified for some combinations of the model’s parameters. 
In particular, the private insurance market can generate higher payoffs for the Central 
government when, ceteris paribus: i) α is sufficiently low and/or the adverse events are very 
infrequent, i.e. when expected inequality is rather low or irrelevant, so that efficiency is 
more appreciated; ii) the productivity of protection investment is high, i.e. when the effect 
of better incentives is more valuable; iii) N is high, which implies a limited incentive 
advantage for the public solution. This discussion is summarised in the following: 
 
Proposition 3: When the Central government cannot commit to a predetermined optimal transfer rule, 
the decentralised mutual public fund solution always dominates the private insurance solution for λ
*m ≥ (N 
– 1)/N. Under specific combinations of parameters α, p, δ, N, the private insurance solution dominates 
the decentralised mutual public fund solution if 0 ≤ λ
*m < (N – 1)/N. 
Proof: Directly from discussion above. ■ 
 
Proposition 3 suggests that even when the Central government is unable to commit to a 
predetermined level of transfers, the welfare-enhancing role of the private insurer is rather 
limited. Notice that this result, combined with Proposition 2, is obtained by assuming 
competitive insurance markets. As we discuss in the next Section, by introducing some 
                                                 
18 This is easily obtained by comparing Eq. (11) with Eq. (18), recalling that ϑ
*dnc = 1.   20




In this section we discuss our findings, which can be summarised as follows: (a) when the 
Central government can credibly commit to a predetermined transfer rule, the public 
mutual solution is a welfare-superior institutional arrangement compared to the private 
insurance solution, since it is possible to obtain the same incentives to invest in protection 
while providing a higher degree of equality; (b) when the Central government is unable to 
commit to an ex-ante optimal transfer rule, the private insurance solution (if insurance 
markets are competitive) might improve welfare with respect to the public mutual fund 
when: i) the number of local administrations is large; ii) the degree of inequality aversion is 
low; iii) the probability for damage to occur is low; iv) the productivity of protection 
investments on the probability for damage to occur is large. At the equilibrium, the 
following inequalities hold: 
1 c * dnc * m * d * = = < < ϑ ϑ λ ϑ   (24) 








C Π Π Π Π < < <   (26) 
Given that the public mutual fund provides more incentives to invest than the private 
insurance solution, the Central government prefers equality over efficiency in the case of a 
private insurance solution; hence, λ
*m  >  ϑ
*d according to Eq. (24). This makes the 
comparison between I
*Ins and I
*d unclear. Since the public mutual fund is always better than 
the private insurance solution when the Central government can credibly commit to a 
predetermined transfer rule, this comparison is irrelevant however. According to 
Proposition 3, I
*Ins might be larger than I
*dnc, but this does not guarantee that Π
*Ins > Π
*dnc. 
Notice that in Eq. (25) and Eq. (26) we have ordered precautionary investments and 
Central government’s payoffs assuming that the parameters of the model assign a welfare-
improving role to private insurers.
19 
                                                 
19 In other words, Eq. (25) and Eq. (26) are obtained assuming that Eq. (23) is satisfied. Otherwise, we obtain: 
c * d * dnc * Ins * I I I I < < <    21
The rationale for these results is grounded in the institutional framework that we want to 
better illustrate in the rest of this section. Remember that in both institutional 
arrangements, local administrations pay a contribution – implicit in the case of the mutual 
fund, explicit in the case of a premium to be paid to an insurer – in order to obtain a 
coverage for these collective risks. However, while the public mutual fund operates with ex-
post contributions defined on the actual realisation of losses, private insurers need to define 
an ex-ante premium. The second mechanism is less efficient in terms of providing the right 
incentives to invest in protection. This is so because, by providing the same level of 
coverage, the public fund mechanism provides more equality among local administrations.  
The possibility that a private insurer could provide higher welfare in some specific regimes 
where Central government is unable to commit to a pre-determined transfer rule, can be 
explained by the different enforceability of the two “contracts”. From this point of view, 
we have assumed that the contract with a private insurer is intrinsically more credible than 
the public fund mechanism. In the first case, the Local administration needs to pay an ex-
ante premium P, and – in exchange – the insurer will reimburse a share λ of losses in case a 
damage occurs. Whenever one of the parties does not accomplish its contractual 
obligation, the other can recur to a civil court and ask for the enforcement of the contract. 
This enforcement is more credible than the one provided by an administrative or 
constitutional court, because the Central government can always renege on the 
commitment and – through a special law – pump more money into specific communities 
hit hard by a disaster. However, these conclusions are based on the hypothesis that the 
private insurer will never default. Otherwise, this enforceability advantage might disappear. 
It is also worth noting that the mechanisms used by the Central government and by the 
private insurer in order to financially support the risks’ coverage are actually associated with 
different risk profiles of these parties. The ex-ante definition of the premium of the private 
insurer implies that he is the one who bears the risk that the collected premiums (based on 
the expected losses) are insufficient to cover the ex-post realised losses. However, since we 
have not taken into account the cost of capital needed to finance coverage, no disadvantage 
for the private insurance solution emerges from this aspect. On the other hand, we have 








C Π Π Π Π < < <  
   22
modelled the Central government as a player that perfectly commits to an aggregate 
transfer equal to NΩ, so that he does not bear any risk similar to the one of the private 
insurer. However, in a more realistic situation the commitment to the ex-ante defined total 
transfer NΩ , may be not credible. One might ask whether this situation could affect our 
results. 
In particular, the Central government could be induced to increase ex-post  equality by 
transferring funds from constituencies not hit by losses to those that are damaged, given 
that the private insurer only partially covers the Local administrations. Recalling what we 
have already illustrated in par. 2.3, the Central government always equalises expenditures ex 
post when its commitment is not credible. As a consequence, the disciplining role of partial 
coverage used by the private insurer ceases to exist: the Local administration keeps 
mitigation investments low, relying on the intervention of the Central government. 
Consequently, the premium requested by the private insurer will be associated with those 
low investments. Summarising, the private insurer definitely loses its welfare-enhancing 
role if the Central government is unable to credibly promise that he will not pay for 
damage that is not completely reimbursed by a private insurer.  
A final difference is clearly in the private nature of the insurer, which maximises its profits. 
This is unlike the Central government, which aims at maximising welfare. If insurance 
markets are not perfectly competitive, there is an additional disadvantage of the private 
insurer solution which is not currently modelled in the paper, and further reinforces our 
main conclusions. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we have considered the institutional arrangements needed in a decentralised 
framework to cope with the potential adverse welfare effects caused by such negative 
shocks as natural disasters, terrorist attacks or clinical errors, which can be ‘limited’ by 
precautionary investments. We build on the work by Goodspeed and Haughwout (2007), 
and we analyse the functioning of a public mutual fund aimed at covering losses from 
“collective risks” investing Local administrations. We then study the potential role of 
private insurers in solving the under-investment problem in protection that stems from the   23
moral hazard of Local administrations facing a transfer rule by the Central government, 
which takes into account the equalisation of resources across Regions. Our analysis shows 
that a public fund is always superior to the private insurance solution in the presence of 
hard budget constraints for Local administrations. However, when the Central government 
cannot credibly commit to an optimal transfer rule, private insurers are sometimes able to 
improve on the mutual public fund solution by inducing a higher level of investments. An 
interesting issue that remains to be analysed is the superiority of a mixed solution (a sort of 
“public-private partnership”), where a public fund is combined with compulsory private 
insurances for Local administrations. This is left for future research.   24
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